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PICTURE A WOMAN driving alone late at night. She is driving
twenty miles per hour over the speed limit when she sees flashing red
police lights behind her. She pulls over to the side of the road in the
darkness. The officer approaches the car, informs her that she was
exceeding the speed limit and that, due to the late time of night and
the high speed at which she was traveling, he will have to take her to
the station in his patrol car instead of issuing her a ticket immediately.
Although puzzled by this solution, the woman complies with the po-
lice officer's orders. Instead of driving her to the station, however, he
drives her to his apartment, takes her inside, and rapes her.
Now picture a fifteen-year-old girl interested in a career in law
enforcement. The local police department offers a program through
which high school students can spend time at the police department,
take a basic course on law enforcement, and receive career advice
from the officers. One of the more exciting parts of the program in-
volves an opportunity for each program participant to go on a one-on-
one ride-along with an on-duty police officer. The program partici-
pant can observe the officer on patrol, responding to calls, making
traffic stops, and otherwise completing officer duties. While on an eve-
ning ride-along, a male officer, with whom the fifteen-year-old became
acquainted during classes at the police station, makes sexual advances
toward the female student. He tells her she is attractive and smart and
that he thinks she could be a good police officer in the future. She
initially objects, but she finds the officer to be not only handsome but
* Class of 2004. The author would like to thank her parents, Roy and Kathleen
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very powerful, convincing, and persistent. The encounter ends in sex-
ual intercourse between the parties in the officer's patrol car.
The California Supreme Court held that the first situation in-
volves such a powerful use of authority that the city employing the
officer can be held vicariously liable for his sexual torts.1 However, in
Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta,2 the California Court of Appeal decided that
the City cannot be held vicariously liable in the second situation.3
Part I of this Note provides background on the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior in California with a focus on the state's treatment
of vicarious liability for sexual torts committed in the scope of employ-
ment. Part II discusses the California Court of Appeal's decision in Doe
1 v. City of Murrieta, a vicarious liability case brought by two sixteen-
year-old females for sexual torts committed by a Murrieta police of-
ficer. Part III argues that the case was decided wrongly and that, in
light of established precedent, the court should have found the City of
Murrieta vicariously liable. More specifically, this section focuses both
on the inherent authority a police officer possesses and the court's
mischaracterization of the relationship between the minors and the
officer. This section also addresses the court's quickness to assert that
the youths consented to the officer's advances. This Note concludes
that the California Court of Appeal should have found Murrieta vicari-
ously liable for the sexual torts of the police officer.
I. Background
A. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior and Its Treatment in
California
The doctrine of respondeat superior holds an employer vicari-
ously liable for the torts that an employee commits within the scope of
employment. 4 The doctrine originated in the common law, and
courts have altered their approach to the doctrine many times since
its inception.5 Although there is some disagreement among legal
1. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1351 (Cal. 1991).
2. 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ct. App. 2002).
3. See id. at 222.
4. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th
ed. 1984); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564-81 (1988); John
H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
5. See Wigmore, supra note 4, at 316.
[Vol. 37
scholars as to the origin of the doctrine, 6 originally courts tended to
hold an employer strictly liable for most tortious harms committed by
an employee. 7 In an early example, courts held a slave owner strictly
liable for any harm caused by his or her slaves.8 However, English
common law, traceable to the sixteenth century, rejected the strict lia-
bility framework and limited vicarious liability to harm resulting from
employee actions specifically authorized by the employer. 9 By the
eighteenth century, courts had yet again shifted their approach and
developed the theory adhered to today-that an employer is vicari-
ously liable for an employee's tortious acts that occur within the scope
of employment. 10
Determining the definition of "scope of employment" has proved
to be a difficult task for courts and has resulted in a variety of formula-
tions depending on the time period, jurisdiction, and the facts of the
case at hand."' The modern California approach dictates that em-
ployee conduct is considered within the scope of employment if it "is
not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the
loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business."12
California courts sharpened this definition by explaining that "the in-
quiry should be whether the risk was one 'that may fairly be regarded
as typical of or broadly incidental' to the enterprise undertaken by the
employer.' 13
California courts consider three policy objectives when determin-
ing whether the tortious act was a risk that was typical of the enter-
prise undertaken by the employer: 1) preventing recurrence of the
tortious conduct; 2) providing greater assurance of compensation for
the victim; and 3) ensuring that the victim's losses will be equitably
borne by those who benefit from the enterprise giving rise to the in-
jury.14 Policy goals have aided courts in, deciding whether a strict lia-
6. See Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding Employers
Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. Rrv. 1513,
1515-16 (1992).
7. See Wigmore, supra note 4, at 317-18.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 392.
10. See id. at 399-402.
11. See id.
12. Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 2002).
13. Id.
14. See Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 454-55 (Cal.
1995); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1347-48 (Cal. 1991); John R. v.
Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 955-57 (Cal. 1989); Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
220-21.
Summer 2003) DOE I V. CITY OF MURRIETA
bility approach is appropriate in the context of a particular case.
Additionally, courts often hinge a refusal to impose vicarious liability
on the policy justification that absolute liability would detrimentally
affect the defendant's business or the community by causing employ-
ers to be unwilling, or unable, to offer certain programs or services if
they may be held liable for employee torts.15 Because the "unusual or
startling" language of the respondeat superior analysis is somewhat
amorphous, in practice, courts often depend on policy to shape their
analysis and, ultimately, to support their holdings.16
B. California's Modem Approach to Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Torts
1. The General Approach
While employee torts appear in a variety of forms, this Note will
limit its discussion to torts involving sexual misconduct in the work-
place in California. Historically, California courts rejected holding
employers vicariously liable for the sexual torts of employees. 17 Many
jurisdictions are especially reluctant to impose strict liability on em-
ployers for the sexual misconduct of employees due to the perception
that "sexual assault is either personally motivated or so unusual that it
is outside of the assailant's scope of employment."' 8 Of course, legiti-
mate questions surround this unwillingness to view torts of a sexual
nature as a risk of the business when so many such cases exist. In fact,
the Supreme Court of California has stated, "We are not persuaded
that the roots of sexual violence and exploitation are in all cases so
fundamentally different from those other abhorrent human traits as
to allow a conclusion sexual misconduct is per se unforeseeable in the
workplace."' 9 Modern decisions from courts in California and around
the country reflect an increased willingness to find vicarious liability in
sexual tort cases now than they were historically. 2 1
15. See John R, 769 P.2d at 956.
16. See Weber, supra note 6, at 1526.
17. See John R., 769 P.2d at 953-954.
18. SeeWeber, supra note 6, at 1514 n.5, 1521-22 nn.33-34 (citing an extensive list of
cases in which employers were not held vicariously liable for sexual torts committed by
employees).
19. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 363 (Cal. 1995).
20. See Weber, supra note 6, at 1514-15.
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2. Sexual Torts in Education
In order to follow the court's analysis in Doe 1, it is helpful to
understand the approach California courts take when addressing sex-
ual misconduct in the education setting.
In John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, the California Supreme
Court considered a vicarious liability claim involving sexual torts
against an educational backdrop.2 1 The court held that the defendant
school district could not be held vicariously liable for a teacher's sex-
ual assault upon a student.22 The case involved a ninth-grade male
student who was molested by his male mathematics teacher. 23 The
molestations occurred at the teacher's apartment while the pair par-
ticipated in an instructional program in which students received train-
ing by assisting teachers as they graded student papers.2 4
Refusing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court
centered its decision on policy.25 Beginning with the deterrence ratio-
nale, the court found that imposing strict liability in an educational
context would result in unwillingness among school districts to au-
thorize extracurricular academic activities involving teachers and stu-
dents.2 6 As for victim compensation, the court emphasized the
difficulty of obtaining insurance for sexual torts and determined that
funds were better allocated to classroom purposes than to covering
sexual tort claims. 27 Finally, discussing the propriety of spreading the
risk of loss among the beneficiaries of the enterprise, the court rea-
soned that "the connection between the authority conferred on teach-
ers to carry out their instructional duties and the abuse of that
authority to indulge in personal, sexual misconduct is simply too at-
tenuated to deem a sexual assault as falling within the range of risks
allocable to a teacher's employer."28 The court distinguished the level
of authority held by a police officer from that held by a teacher and
refused to expand the vicarious liability doctrine to the facts in John
Rj29
21. See John R, 769 P.2d at 949.
22. See id. at 949.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id, at 956-57.
26. See id. at 956.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 956-57.
Summner 20031 DOE I V. CITY OF MURRIETA 1095
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
C. Police Officer Sexual Torts: California's Exception to the
Traditional Approach to Vicarious Liability
California created a significant exception to the general rule bar-
ring vicarious liability for sexual torts by applying the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior in the context of sexual assaults committed by on-
duty police officers against civilians. 31 The California Supreme Court
commented that "[i]n view of the considerable power and authority
that police officers possess, it is neither startling nor unexpected that
on occasion an officer will misuse that authority by engaging in as-
saultive conduct."3 ' The exception results from the "unique position
of both trust and power" that police officers occupy in American soci-
ety.3 2 However, the court has refused to extend this exception to pri-
vately-employed security officers, regardless of their display of
authority.3 1 Additionally, the court has made clear that the mere fact
that a perpetrator occupies a position of seniority in the workplace is
not enough to merit a finding of vicarious liability.34 Rather, the court
has limited the exception to the narrow circumstances when an on-
duty police officer uses his unique position of authority to sexually
assault a civilian.3 5
In White v. County of Orange,3 6 the California Court of Appeal held
the county employer vicariously liable for the acts of a police officer
who kidnapped a civilian during a traffic stop and threatened to rape
and murder her.3 7 Citing the extensive authority vested in police of-
ficers, the court paved the way for the creation of a vicarious liability
exception for on-duty police officers.
30. See Thorn v. City of Glendale, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the
on-duty police officer exception but holding the exception inapplicable to the facts of the
case involving a fire marshal who intentionally started a fire that burned down a building).
31. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1350 (Cal. 1991).
32. Thorn, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3.
33. See Maria D. v. Westec Residential Sec., Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 339-42 (Ct.
App. 2000) (noting that the California Supreme Court intended to limit the exception to
acts by police officers and that security guards are not authorized to perform many of the
acts of authority consistent with police officers' duties, such as making traffic stops, interro-
gations and identification checks).
34. See Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 454 (Cal. 1995)
(finding that the deputy sheriff was not exercising job-conferred authority over the female
deputy sheriffs he sexually harassed because his supervisory authority over the subordinate
deputies did not include the power to detain, arrest, or jail any individual).
35. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1351.
36. 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1985).
37. See id. at 496.
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In Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles,3s the leading California case on
vicarious liability for the sexual torts of police officers, the California
Supreme Court solidified this police officer exception when it held
the defendant City vicariously liable for a police officer's rape of a
woman during a traffic stop.39 The court considered the policy objec-
tives of vicarious liability and concluded that all three objectives sup-
ported holding the city liable on the facts of the case.40 Considering
the deterrence justification, the court found that imposing liability for
sexual torts of police officers would not impair law enforcement abili-
ties because preventive measures would be easily implemented and
would not reduce police effectiveness. 41 Second, the court noted that
the legislature's enactment of the California Tort Claims Act, under
which governmental entities can be held vicariously liable, signifies
the appropriateness of implementing respondeat superior to sexual
torts of police officers. 42 Finally, the court cited the "extraordinary
power and authority" police officers possess and determined that the
community should bear the cost of the misuse of power since the com-
munity benefits from exercise of the power.43
The court justified its departure from the holding in John R. by
focusing on the drastic difference in authority possessed by teachers
and police officers.44 Doe 1 arose against this backdrop of a general
refusal to find vicarious liability for sexual torts except in the context
of sexual misconduct by on-duty police officers.
II. The Case: Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta
A. The Parties
In Doe 1, plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 3 filed a civil suit for
damages against defendants Officer Derick Boyd ("Officer Boyd") and
his employer, the City of Murrieta ("the City").45 The plaintiffs were
both sixteen years old at the time the incidents occurred. 46 They be-
came acquainted with Officer Boyd while participating in a program
38. 814 P.2d 1341.
39. See id. at 1342.
40. See id. at 1347-50.
41. See id. at 1347-48.
42. See id. at 1348.
43. See id. at 1349.
44. See id. at 1349.
45. See Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 216-17 (Ct. App. 2002).
46. See id. at 216.
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offered by the Murrieta Police Department to local students inter-
ested in law enforcement as a career. 47
B. Procedural History
Officer Boyd was criminally charged with committing felony sex-
ual acts with plaintiffs and pled guilty to the charges. 48 Plaintiffs next
filed a civil suit against Officer Boyd and the City asserting five causes
of action: negligence, battery, sexual battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and breach of contract.49 The trial court sustained
defendant City's demurrers without leave to amend for the battery,
sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes
of action, and granted defendants' summary judgment motions for
the negligence and breach of contract causes of action.50 The plain-
tiffs appealed the trial court's findings on all five causes of action. 51
After issuance of the appellate court opinion, which is the subject of
this Note, the California Supreme Court denied plaintiffs" petition for
review. 52
C. The Parties' Contentions
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in
refusing to find the City vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of
Officer Boyd.5 4 The plaintiffs urged the court to follow Mary M. and
find the City liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because
Officer Boyd committed the sexual torts while on-duty and in a posi-
tion of inherent authority. 54 The defendants countered by asserting
that the facts of the case were distinguishable from Mary M. because
the minors each had a personal relationship with Officer Boyd and
voluntarily accompanied him on the ride-alongs during which the sex-
ual incidents occurred.55 The defendants also emphasized that Officer
Boyd did not use force or authority during his sexual acts with plain-
tiffs, characterizing the sexual acts as consensual.56
47. See id. at 216-17.
48. See id. at 218.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See 2002 Cal. LEXIS 8620 (Dec. 18, 2002).
53. See Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218.
54. See id. at 220-21.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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D. The Facts
The Murrieta Police Department collaborated with the Boy
Scouts of America and formed a Police Explorer Program ("the pro-
gram").57 The purpose of the program was to introduce students be-
tween the ages of fourteen and eighteen to law enforcement as a
career option.5 8 Among other activities, the program allowed partici-
pating explorers to go on one-on-one ride-alongs with an on-duty po-
lice officer.59 Program regulations generally permitted one ride-along
per month, and a variety of regulations governed the appropriate
times and procedures for all officer-explorer interactions.60 For exam-
ple, the explorer handbook prohibited dating or other close social
relationships between adults and explorers and specified that one-on-
one contact between explorers and adults was prohibited except dur-
ing authorized ride-alongs. 61
Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 3 enrolled in the explorer
program and developed a liking for thirty-two-year-old Officer Boyd.62
Between September 1997 and December 1997, each minor accompa-
nied Boyd on frequent ride-alongs, the majority of which occurred
late at night.63 Jane Doe 1 went on between thirty and forty ride-
alongs while Jane Doe 3 went on fifteen to twenty ride-alongs with
Boyd.64 During many of the one-on-one ride-alongs, Boyd engaged in
sexual encounters with the plaintiffs. 65 The plaintiffs later disclosed
the sexual encounters, and Boyd was investigated on suspicion of un-
lawful sexual intercourse with a person under eighteen years of age,
oral copulation with a person under eighteen, sodomy with a person
under eighteen, and penetration with a foreign object of a person
57. See id. at 217.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. SeeThird Amended Complaint for Damages at A-65, Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 126
Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ct. App. 2002) (No. 317616).
62. See Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.
63. See id. at 218.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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under eighteen.6 6 Officer Boyd entered a guilty plea to criminal
charges for the former two felony charges.67
E. The Decision
The appellate court began by citing the California vicarious liabil-
ity statute which states a public employer can be held liable "for injury
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public
entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission
would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee or his personal representative." 68 The court also
recited the general vicarious liability principle adhered to in Califor-
nia, that an employer could be held liable for conduct "not so unusual
or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from
it among other costs of the employer's business." 69
In its analysis, the court first distinguished White by noting that,
instead of being stopped, kidnapped, and threatened, plaintiffs "be-
came infatuated with Boyd, pursued him, and consented to his sexual
acts."7y This characterization of the facts led the court to conclude
that "the illicit sexual acts did not arise out of the exercise of Boyd's
job-created authority over plaintiffs." 7 1 The court then moved to a pol-
icy discussion, arguing that a strict liability finding was inappropriate
on the facts. 72 As for deterrence, the court recommended a negli-
gence approach and expressed concern that "imposing vicarious lia-
bility might deter police departments from sponsoring explorer
programs." 73 Second, the court found that assuring compensation to
plaintiffs through the doctrine of respondeat superior was not crucial
because they could receive compensation through a negligence
claim.74 Finally, the court resurrected language from John R and
found, as to the policy goal of assuring broad and equitable distribu-
tion of the losses, that "[t] he connection [between the authority con-
66. See Carl Love, Murrieta Officer Held on Suspicion of Sex with Cadets; Police Explorer
Adviser Resigns After the Allegations Surface, THIE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), Jan. 7,
1998, at B01.
67. SeeJoe Vargo, Boyd Pleads Guilty to Sexual Activity with 2 Teen-Agers; The Former Mur-
rieta Police Officer Could Serve a Prison Term for Misconduct with 16-Year-Old Girls, THE PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), Mar. 11, 1998, at B01.
68. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 815.2(a) (West 2002).
69. Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218-19.
70. Id. at 219.
71. Id. at 220.
72. See id. at 220-21.
73. Id. at 220.
74. See id.
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ferred and abuse of that authority] is 'not great enough to persuade
us that vicarious liability should attach here' for Boyd's personal tort
since he exercised no job-conferred authority over plaintiffs when he
engaged in sexual acts with them. '75
The court justified its conclusion on the third policy factor by
asserting that factually the case more closely resembled John R. rather
than Mary M.76 Framing the relationship between Boyd and plaintiffs
as that of teacher-student, the court stated that "Boyd was plaintiffs'
explorer adviser and trainer when the sexual misconduct occurred." 77
The court reasoned that Boyd's relationship with plaintiffs was that of
a "coworker rather than that of a police officer exercising law enforce-
ment over a member of the general public."78 Thus, on the basis of
plaintiffs' "infatuation" with Boyd,79 policy objectives,80 and the co-
worker relationship between thirty-two-year-old Boyd and the sixteen-
year-old plaintiffs, 8 1 the Doe 1 court held that the City could not be
held vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of Officer Boyd.82
HI. Analysis
In refusing to hold the City vicariously liable for the sexual torts
of Officer Boyd, the court incorrectly evaluated the policy objectives
and underestimated the inherent authority a police officer asserts
over any member of society, particularly over minors. The court also
overestimated the ability of a sixteen-year-old girl to consent to the
sexual advances of a thirty-two-year-old police officer. Ultimately, the
court endangered an important exception to the general respondeat
superior doctrine the California Supreme Court carved out in Mary
M.
A. The Court Incorrectly Evaluated the Policy Objectives
The court departed from its pattern of analysis in previous cases
when discussing the policy objectives in Doe 1. The court, possibly un-
comfortable with the prospect of holding the City vicariously liable for
the sexual torts of Officer Boyd, shaped its policy analysis to conform
75. Id.
76. See id. at 221.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 222.
79. See id. at 219.
80. See id. at 220-221.
81. See id at 222.
82. See id,
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to its desired outcome. Instead, the court should have followed the
established precedent of Mary M. or distinguished that holding and its
on-duty police officer exception.
1. The Relative Importance of Safeguarding Academic Tutoring
Programs as Compared to Police Explorer Programs
Devoting only one sentence to the deterrence policy justification,
the Doe 1 court mimicked its reasoning in John R and expressed con-
cern that holding the City vicariously liable for Officer Boyd's acts
could deter police departments from offering explorer programs.8 3
While many police departments across California offer police ex-
plorer programs with the goal of sparking student interest in law en-
forcement,8 4 the range of students who benefit from access to the
tutoring at issue in John 1 likely exceeds the number of students who
take advantage of police explorer programs. Protecting academic tu-
torial programs is of greater importance based on students' need to
understand basic academic subjects in order to be successful at any
career, including law enforcement. Consequently, the court's ratio-
nale based on protecting access to teachers who can provide addi-
tional instruction is more persuasive. At a minimum, the Doe 1 court
should have acknowledged the difference in the value of a police ex-
plorer program and the value of teacher availability for tutoring stu-
dents when assessing the deterrence rationale.
2. The Court's Improper Reliance on Plaintiffs' Potential Success
on a Negligence Claim
The court relied on the potential success of a negligence claim in
an effort to strengthen its position, 85 thus deviating from its usual
method of framing arguments either in favor of or against the use of
strict liability as a method of assuring victims compensation.8 6 Numer-
83. See id. at 220.
84. See News Release, Fraternal Order of Police, California State Lodge (Oct. 26,
2000) (announcing grants to 211 different police explorer programs in California), availa-
ble at www.cafop.org/pressrel02.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
85. SeeDoe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220 ("[T]he objective of assuring plaintiffs' compen-
sation is not a weighty factor since compensation may be achieved through proving direct
negligence ....").
86. See, e.g., Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 366-67 (Cal.
1995) (pointing out that the lack of discussion in the parties' briefs as to the availability of
insurance to medical providers for coverage of sexual torts of employees resulted in the
court's inability to make a policy finding on the assurance of victim compensation ratio-
nale); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1348 (Cal. 1991) (noting that vicari-
ous liability is an appropriate method of assuring victim compensation because statutory
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ous California cases addressing the second policy justification of assur-
ing compensation narrowed the issue to a discussion of availability of
insurance to compensate the victim, not the victim's ability to succeed
on other causes of action.8 7 As long as the court has interpreted statu-
tory tort laws to permit the government to be held vicariously liable
for the torts of its employees, the court should not base its refusal to
find vicarious liability on the availability of other causes of action for
the plaintiff to pursue.
3. The Court Underestimated Officer Boyd's Position of Authority
a. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles and White v. County of Orange
Authority was the most important factor prompting the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to carve out a respondeat superior exception for
tortious acts committed by police officers."" In White v. County of Or-
ange, Officer Loudermilk stopped a female motorist, put her in his
patrol car, and drove her around for several hours while, threatening
to rape and murder her.89 The court articulated its support for a find-
ing of vicarious liability:
[T]he police officer carries the authority of the law with him into
the community. The officer is supplied with a conspicuous automo-
bile, a badge and a gun to ensure immediate compliance with his
directions. The officer's method of dealing with this authority is
certainly incidental to his duties; indeed, it is an integral part of
them.90
The court pointed out that "[h ] ad Loudermilk not been a deputy
sheriff, in uniform, in a marked patrol vehicle using flashing red
lights, White would not have stopped at his direction and the events
that followed would not have occurred."9 1
law in California allows government entities to be held liable for employee torts within the
scope of employment); John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal.
1989) (focusing on the inability of school districts to obtain insurance to cover strict liabil-
ity claims and the resulting diversion of funds, otherwise dedicated to classroom purposes,
to compensating tort claim victims); Maria D. v. Westec Residential Sec., Inc., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 326, 331 (Ct. App. 2000) (agreeing with the finding in Mary M. that the legisla-
ture's willingness to hold government employers vicariously liable for torts of government
employees indicates that vicarious liability is an appropriate method of assuring victim
compensation).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. See Michelle Neumann-Ribner, When Good Cops Go Bad: Can a City Be Held Liable for
a Rape or Murder Committed by an On-Duty Police Officer?, I SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J., 457, 465
(1993).
89. See 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 494 (Ct. App. 1985).
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id.
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Similarly, the officer in Mary M. took advantage of his job-con-
ferred authority to accomplish sexual misconduct.'-92 The court ex-
plained that the officer first misused his authority as a law
enforcement officer to lure the plaintiff into his car, drive her to her
home, and rape her.93 He further misused his authority by threaten-
ing to take the plaintiff to jail when she attempted to resist his ad-
vances. 94 The court also noted "it is necessary to examine the
employees' conduct as a whole, not simply the tortious act itself' when
deciding whether vicarious liability is appropriate..9 5 The court found
that the officer's conduct as a whole indicated a misuse of authority
that culminated in the rape of the plaintiff.9 6 Both White and Mary M.
involve an officer who took advantage of his unique position of job-
conferred authority to gain access to the victims and to engage in tor-
tious activity.
While the facts of Doe 1 are distinguishable from those of White
and Mary M. in a variety of ways, the inherent authority Officer Boyd
possessed as a result of his position as a police officer is the same au-
thority that is at play in the other cases. One way in which Doe 1 differs
is that the plaintiffs in that case chose to be in the company of Officer
Boyd,97 whereas the Mary M. and White plaintiffs were not acquainted
with the offending officers prior to the incidents. 98 Despite the fact
that the Doe 1 plaintiffs knew Officer Boyd, it is unlikely that the ap-
parent or actual authority of Officer Boyd was diminished or that they
felt less obligated to follow his orders simply because they were under
his tutelage through the explorer program.
Before Officer Boyd agreed to take the plaintiffs on ride-alongs, it
is likely that he or other officers educated the explorers about the
potential dangers associated with ride-alongs and instructed them, for
their safety, to follow the accompanying police officer's orders at all
times. Since plaintiffs were minors, they may have been less aware of a
policeman's ability to abuse his authority than an adult might be, mak-
ing an objective assessment of Officer Boyd's conduct more difficult
92. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1351 (Cal. 1991).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1350.
96. See id. at 1351.
97. See Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 221 (Ct. App. 2002).
98. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1342-43; White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493,
494 (Ct. App. 1985).
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for them. Viewing Officer Boyd's conduct as a whole, 99 he was in a
position of authority at all times because he was on-duty during the
sexual encounters. 100 Officer Boyd's authority likely influenced plain-
tiffs' responses to his sexual advances and contributed significantly to
the illicit acts that transpired between Boyd and the plaintiffs. Based
on the focus on authority in the Mary M. and White cases,10 1 the court
should have accorded more weight to the level of authority Boyd pos-
sessed during the sexual encounters.
b. The Court's Mischaracterization of Officer Boyd's Relationship
with the Plaintiffs
The court did not grant sufficient attention to Officer Boyd's po-
sition of authority when it found the Doe 1 facts akin to a teacher-
student or supervisor-trainee situation instead of an officer-civilian
case. First, the court stated "[t]he instant case is more akin to the John
R. case involving a teacher-student relationship since Boyd was plain-
tiffs' explorer adviser and trainer when the sexual misconduct oc-
curred."10 2 While it is true that plaintiffs were under the supervision of
Officer Boyd as part of the police explorer program, the sexual inci-
dents occurred while Boyd was on duty,10 3 in uniform, wearing a gun,
and exercising his authority over members of the public.'0 4 Teachers
are accorded a significant level of authority in the classroom, but it is
always clear to students that the authority a teacher has over them in
that context does not extend to others outside of the classroom. Older
students, such as those of plaintiffs' age, would also realize that drasti-
cally different repercussions may result from refusing to follow the
instructions of a teacher as compared to those of a police officer. Stu-
dents who ignore a teacher's instructions risk being sent to the princi-
pal's office, serving detention, or having their parents called by the
school. Conversely, the risk of criminal repercussions, such as being
handcuffed, arrested, or going to jail, are certainly far more serious
and would compel many more individuals to obey police orders. In
light of the difference in the level of actual and perceived authority,
99. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1350 (stating that vicarious liability determinations should
be made by looking at the employee's conduct as a whole instead of solely examining the
tortious act).
100. See Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218.
101. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1349-51; White, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
102. Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221.
103. See id. at 218.
104. See Third Amended Complaint for Damages at 6, Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta, 126
Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ct. App. 2002) (No. 317616).
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the court should reconsider its inaccurate characterization of the of-
ficer-explorer relationship as similar to that of teacher and student.
The court in Doe 1 also compared the relationship between Boyd
and plaintiffs to the supervisor-trainee relationship explored in Farm-
ers Insurance Group v. County of Santa Clara.10 5 In that case, three fe-
male deputy sheriffs sued Santa Clara County for sexual harassment
by a male deputy sheriff. 116 The California Supreme Court refused to
apply respondeat superior, in part because "the work-related authority
of a supervisor over a trainee employee in a county sheriff's depart-
ment is in no way comparable to the extraordinary power and author-
ity that police officers exercise over members of the public." 10 7
Interestingly, the Doe 1 court opined that Officer Boyd did not exer-
cise his authority over a member of the general public, but rather
against "individuals who worked with Boyd and were trained and su-
pervised by him."""' It seems unlikely that either the members of the
explorer program or the officers of the Murrieta Police Department
thought of the program as one in which the officers were "working"
alongside children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.
Rather, the purpose of the program was to expose students to oppor-
tunities associated with a career in law enforcement. 19 Since the pro-
gram guidelines only permitted one ride-along per month, the
creators of the explorer program likely did not envision officers and
high school students collaborating to fight crime. Instead, the creators
probably envisioned it as an occasional observational opportunity for
the students.
c. Other Cases Demonstrating the Court's Misapplication of
Authority in Doe 1
Two other cases provide guidance on the court's misplaced analy-
sis of the authority issue in Doe 1. 110 Maria D. v. Westec Residential Secur-
ity, Inc.III involved a private security guard who posed as a police
officer and stopped and raped a motorist.112 Differentiating between
105. See Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 444-46 (Cal.
1995).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 454.
108. Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr, 2d at 221.
109. See id. at 217.
110. See Maria D. v. Westec Residential Sec., Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326 (Ct. App. 2000);
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P,2d 358 (Cal. 1995).
111. 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326.
112. See id. at 327-28.
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the level of authority and control of a police officer and that of a pri-
vate security guard, the court focused on actual authority and stated
"[t] he security guard's actual authority is not comparable to that of a
police officer.' 13 There, the court refused to focus on apparent au-
thority and the level of fear -plaintiff felt when confronted with an in-
dividual she thought to be a police officer. 14 Applying this distinction
to Doe 1, the court should have focused on the actual authority of the
police officer instead of characterizing the personal relationship be-
tween the plaintiffs and Officer Boyd as one that minimized the of-
ficer's apparent authority.
In Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital,'1 5 the plaintiff
sued defendants hospital and employee lab technician Tripoli after
the technician sexually molested the plaintiff during an obstetrical ul-
trasound exam. 11 6 The court refused to find vicarious liability on
those facts and rejected plaintiff's argument that the authority of a
technician during an exam was similar to that of a police officer dur-
ing a traffic stop.117 Distinguishing between job-conferred authority
and a position of trust, the court stated, "Tripoli abused his position of
trust, since he had no legal or coercive authority over plaintiff."' 18 The
court pointed out that the "[h] ospital did not give Tripoli any power
to exercise general control over plaintiff's liberty."" 19 In contrast, at all
times during the interactions between the Doe 1 plaintiffs and Officer
Boyd, Boyd retained the ability to exercise legal control over them
through the use of job-conferred authority, not trust. The court
should have placed a higher value on this legal control element when
deciding whether or not to impose liability on the City.
B. The Court Did Not Properly Consider Plaintiffs' Age When
Determining the Issue of Consent to Officer Boyd's
Sexual Advances
In its statement of the facts, the Doe 1 court summarily described
the ride-alongs resulting in the tortious acts as "consensual sexual en-
counters."'1 21 The court paid almost no attention to the fact that plain-
tiffs were merely sixteen years old when the sexual encounters
113. See id. at 341.
114. See id.
115. 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995).
116. See id. at 359-60.
117. See id. at 365-66.
118. Id. at 365.
119. Id. at 366.
120. Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 2002).
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occurred. Examination of the statutory rape laws and the policy be-
hind those enactments sheds light on legislative concerns about sex-
ual encounters involving minors.1 21 The concern about consent, had
it been acknowledged by the Doe 1 court, may have impacted the pol-
icy analysis and led the court to a different conclusion regarding vica-
rious liability.
California Penal Code section 261.5, the statutory rape provision,
sets the age of consent for sexual intercourse at eighteen years.1 22 Sec-
tion 261.5 also creates tiers of penalty levels based on the age differ-
ence between the minor and the offending adult, escalating the
severity of punishment as the age difference between a victim and a
perpetrator increases. 123 While there are several justifications support-
ing statutory rape laws, one of the driving forces behind the legislation
is the inability of minors to consent to sexual intercourse with the
same capacity as adults. 124
The law of statutory rape reflects an attempt to protect teenagers
from themselves, as well as from those who would prey upon their
vulnerability. It also represents a necessary complement to conven-
tional rape law, which offers little protection to the teenager who, due
to fear, confusion, coercion, or inexperience, has "consented" to un-
wanted sex.125
Concerns of legislators and academics about the potential coer-
cion of women under age eighteen stem from the notion that a minor
is incapable of giving the same knowing, objective consent that an
adult can give and therefore needs additional protection. 126 Applying
this principle to the Doe 1 case, the court overestimated the plaintiffs'
ability to consent to Officer Boyd's initiation of sexual conduct.
The court stated that plaintiffs "became infatuated with Boyd,
pursued him, and consented to his sexual acts."1 27 The emphasis the
court placed on plaintiffs' alleged pursuit of Boyd suggests that plain-
tiffs' infatuation with Boyd served as a proxy for consent to sexual acts.
The reason the legislature created special laws for statutory rape is not
solely because some adults prey on unsuspecting youths. 128 Rather,
121. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for
Statutoiy Rape, 48 BUFF. L. Ray. 703, 710 (2000).
122. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West 2003).
123. See id. § 261.5(b)-(d).
124. See Oberman, supra note 121, at 710.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 709-10.
127. Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 219 (Ct. App. 2002).
128. See Oberman, supra note 121, at 710.
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statutory rape laws reflect a minor's inability to give the same consent
that an adult can give, even if they may feel attracted to or romanti-
cally interested in the adult. 29 The plaintiffs in Doe 1 may well have
been attracted to Officer Boyd. However, evidence of this attraction
alone does not justify the court's quick conclusion that Boyd obtained
the consent of plaintiffs prior to the sexual acts.
It is difficult to understand how a court, which must apply legisla-
tive determinations regarding the age of consent for sexual inter-
course in a criminal context, could declare in a civil suit that sixteen-
year-old girls granted full consent to the acts of a thirty-two-year-old
on-duty police officer. If the court had taken the position that Officer
Boyd did use authority over plaintiffs in obtaining their "consent" for
his sexual advances, the third policy objective of ensuring that the vic-
tim's losses will be equitably borne by those benefiting from the enter-
prise giving rise to the injury might have been decided differently.
The court analyzed the authority conferred by the job and the abuse
of that authority in order to procure consent for sexual conduct and
stated, "The connection is 'not great enough to persuade us that vica-
rious liability should attach here' for Boyd's personal tort since he
exercised no job-conferred authority over plaintiffs when he engaged
in sexual acts with them."' 3  A finding that Officer Boyd did take ad-
vantage of his job-conferred authority may have swayed the court to
find that policy dictated a finding of vicarious liability.
Conclusion
The California Court of Appeal erred in refusing to hold the City
vicariously liable for the sexual torts of Officer Boyd. The court mis-
takenly found that the police explorer program created a relationship
between Officer Boyd and plaintiff participants that was akin to a su-
pervisor-trainee relationship. Instead, it should have acknowledged
that plaintiffs likely saw Officer Boyd, as did most members of the pub-
lic, as a uniformed police officer vested with the full authority of en-
forcing the law. In addition to refusing to acknowledge Officer Boyd's
inherent authority, the court, if anything, characterized the plaintiffs
as sexual aggressors who actively pursued Officer Boyd. This charac-
terization did not take into account the young age of plaintiffs or the
fact that the law did not view them as capable of giving consent to
sexual intercourse.
129. See id.
130. Doe 1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220.
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With this holding, the California Court of Appeal endangered
the key exception to vicarious liability analysis that the California Su-
preme Court carved out in Mary M. Instead of analogizing to John R
and embarking on a policy analysis at odds with precedent, the court
should have either followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Mary M. or
distinguished that ruling, if the court is no longer willing to provide
an on-duty policy officer exception. The result of the Doe 1 decision is
to create uncertainty among police departments and victims as to the
California courts' stance on this important issue.
